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Abstract 
From time to time, in the scientific literature or in science popularization articles, appears the question: 
Why do we remember the past but we can’t remember the future? This question, of course, finds its 
legitimacy in the time symmetry of the equations of physics. However, it is not always answered clearly, 
and there are still debates about the best way to explain this paradox. In the present article, I analyze the 
remembering process in the perspective of the entropic arrow of time to grasp the possibility of memories 
of the future, and to understand what that would actually mean. 
 
Remembering Process and Arrow of Time 
Laws of physics, for all practical purpose here, can be assumed as time-symmetric. It may not strictly be the 
case, but we will see that no potential asymmetry is necessary to explain the current paradox. In this context, 
every state of a system that we view as a consequence of the past could be seen as a consequence of the 
future in exactly the same way. We view memory as a record of events in the form of stored information in 
the brain; but depending on what events we are considering, this type of information could be a “memory” 
of the future as well as a memory of the past. However, it seems that it is not the case. How can we explain 
that? 
What does remembering actually mean? We can describe remembering as the combination of three different 
processes: recording an event (as a result of a sensitive path, some atoms in the brain –to make it simple- 
switch to a particular position and state, resulting in a storage of information), accessing the information, 
and making sense of that information. The fact is, those three processes, as we understand them, happen in 
the macro world that is subject to the entropic arrow of time. Storing information globally increases entropy, 
as well as accessing that information and making sense of it. That means we make sense of a memory after 
we access it, we access it after we record it, and we record it after the associated event occurs. The existence 
of those processes, and the apparent absence of a similar combination of processes regarding future events, 
basically explain why we only can remember events from the past. 
 
Remembering the Future? 
Let’s go a bit further. The fact that accessing the information and making sense of it are processes that need 
to follow the entropic arrow of time is not enough, from a purely logical perspective, to conclude that we 
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cannot remember the future. We could still imagine that some recorded information in our brain is a 
“consequence” of future events, as much as a consequence of past events, if we consider the symmetry of 
the laws of physics. We somehow understand the rationale behind the later approach (the first process I was 
referring to, consisting in a complex entropy-creating chain of phenomena including the usage of sensors 
such as eyes or ears, and resulting in stored information – a local decrease of entropy). However, we cannot 
ignore the former. In that case, what appears to be information destruction, following the entropic arrow of 
time, would be a time-reversed process of information storage. If the stored information can be seen as a 
“consequence” of future events, the fact we have to access that information and make sense of it following 
the usual arrow of time does not prevent us from “remembering the future”. For this, we would only need 
to apply those two processes before the future event associated with the stored information occurs (assuming 
here that accessing memories does not alter such information).  
 
 
 
Of course, the process combinations depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 may be completely independent. In 
other words, they may not be associated with the same information: memories of the future do not have to 
be memories of the past as well. Therefore, accessing information linked to future events and making sense 
of it may be completely different processes from the ones at work with memories of past events. They would 
have to exist anyway, if we still want to talk about something like “remembering”. 
 
Macro-Events vs. Micro-Events 
However, there is a fundamental asymmetry, related to the different types of events we may record. 
Information storage in our memory is a very effective (though entropy-creating) process, fruit of evolution, 
to record macro events. When I walk into a new apartment, my brain does not have to record every single 
detail of the scene: it stores information in a way that will allow me to somehow visualize it when I 
remember it. There are many ways the scene I witness could been different without changing the sense I 
make of it when I remember it (billions of molecules could, for example, change place without consequence 
in the outcome of the process). It is in that sense that the standard memorizing process is about macro-
events: it is a consistent process whose outcome is largely unchanged by small variations of its inputs. 
Incidentally, it is also event-independent or, said differently, replicable: it would work basically the same 
way if I were visiting a different place. This is a necessary condition for making sense of recorded 
information: without replicability, the information access process and/or the making-sense process would 
need to be event-dependent as well, probably preventing the remembering process from being reliable or 
even useful at all. 
On the other hand, what would it mean to say that some stored information in my brain is the consequence 
of future events? Actually, no consistent and replicable time-reversed process that one can think of could 
store information from future macro-events. Indeed, such a complex process would require global time-
reversed entropy creation, or, in other words, global entropy reduction following the entropic arrow of time, 
3 
 
which cannot happen in a consistent and replicable way. In this scenario, atom states forming a memory of 
the future have to be the time-reversed result of very precise micro-events happening in my brain after 
(potentially long after) the information is stored. I am talking about very precise events in the sense that any 
small change in those micro-events would end-up in a completely different atom configuration before them 
(which is basically the statistical characteristic of the entropic arrow of time). 
Figure 3 bellow illustrates the two potential information-recording processes. Once again, they may or may 
not be exclusive: stored information may be linked to past events only, to future events only, or to both. 
 
 
To use a classical analogy, let’s consider two ways to build an egg, a particularly low-entropy object when 
considering all the constituents it requires. One way consists in using a complex system called a chicken. 
The process for building an egg is here consistent (small changes in the environment should not change 
much the outcome), and replicable (if I take a different chicken, chances that the outcome will be a slice of 
bacon instead of an egg are slim). Another way is to use a broken egg that fell on the floor, and wait for 
nature to rebuild it spontaneously. It would require ridiculously precise tuning, a unique combination of 
micro-events, for a process to rebuild a broken egg; and no particular macro-event can be associated with 
that configuration. Said differently, the same macro-state around the broken egg will never lead to an 
unbroken egg unless this precise configuration occurs: therefore, if an unbroken egg can be seen as the time-
reversed record of very precise future micro-events, it can never be seen as a time-reversed record of any 
future macro-event. 
We can say the same about memory: it would require a similar kind of precision to put those brain atoms in 
their current memory state through a time-reversed process. In both ways regarding the arrow of time, we 
decrease entropy locally to store information. In one way, through a complex but consistent and replicable 
process that requires global increase of entropy to record a macro-event. In the other way, through the natural 
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entropy decrease of an event-specific time-reversed process. However, in this last case, the recorded 
information is linked to a unique combination of future micro-events, not to any future macro-event.  
As a result, if I consider recording processes in a symmetric way, there is no macro-event in the future that 
I can make sense of from the information I am accessing in my brain. In other words, I cannot remember 
future macro-events, the only kind of events that can make sense to me. 
 
Memories of the future and time symmetry 
I based my line of reasoning on the idea that we should consider the symmetry of the laws of physics, and 
therefore the symmetry between past and future when we access our memory. The result is that I cannot 
record any future macro-event the same way I record past macro-events. This result, as relevant as is may 
be, is not enough to answer the initial question. Because of the symmetric approach, I am talking here about 
future macro-events that might lead to the recorded information following a time-reversed process. 
However, at the time I access that information, it does not matter whether the information will be stored in 
a time-reversed process involving series of fined-tuned micro-events or destroyed by a more conventional 
process, potentially associated with a macro-event. There are two ways to describe the same reality, as we 
can show using again the previous example: the egg can be seen as recorded information of series of future 
and time-reversed converging waves in the floor, launching in the air all the constituents of the broken egg, 
and precise electro-magnetic interactions putting everything together. Or it can be seen as recorded 
information of the fact the egg “un-fell” from the floor. Seen from the present moment, “un-falling from the 
floor” and “falling on the floor” are just two different ways to describe the same macro-event. And here, 
conditions on fine-tuning are somehow relaxed: there is an infinite number of ways an egg can “un-fall” 
from the floor, and result in the same egg. Said differently, when memories disappear as a result of a macro-
event (and not as a result of a long process involving only punctual micro-events – i.e. the egg decaying 
slowly, in our example), we come back to a more parallel situation regarding events to make sense of: 
whether we are considering the past or the future, our recorded memories may actually be associated with 
macro-events. In both cases, the remembered macro-event will precede the time of “recording”.  
Then, we may argue that there are many different possible ways my memories can be destroyed as a result 
of a macro-event. There are, for example, many ways to pass away from violent death. So how could the 
same recorded information potentially be a memory of two very different future macro-events? 
Well, it can, but once again, there is no way to make sense of it. This is contrary to the standard memory 
recording process, because of one of its fundamental characteristics: its segregating capacity. This quality 
is what forbids (at least in most cases) two different macro-events to result in the same recorded information. 
This is obviously not the case for a hypothetical process recording information from future events. If I die 
in a car accident or in a plane crash next year (two very different macro-events), the time-reversed outcome 
will be the same regarding most of my present “memories”1. Being consistent and replicable is not enough 
for a remembering process to be effective: it also needs to be segregating, a capacity that cannot be found 
in the type of mechanism we are considering here. 
To sum-up: if we look at micro-events creating information in a time-reversed process, we lack consistency 
and replicability; if we look at cases of macro-events causing the destruction of information, we lack 
segregation.  
                                                          
1 In a perfectly deterministic world, one could argue that there is no time when my destiny can take one direction 
or another, coming from the same past. I would be in a trajectory (a “world line”) leading to a unique sequence of 
events. Segregation would be pointless, due to the unicity of this trajectory that would embed all recorded 
information in my brain. The “memories” of my death in a car accident or in a plane crash would be as different as 
the two separate potential trajectories leading to those events. However, there are always ways to imagine a 
macro-event caused in a far future by a phenomenon that is not in my current light cone. In that case, all 
“memories” until the moment this phenomenon’s consequences reach my light cone will be independent from the 
future event in question. I then come back to my initial point, even in such a world: from the present, I cannot 
benefit from any segregation from the future recording process. 
5 
 
 
Memories in motion 
We just looked at cases of memory destruction as a result of future macro-events, cases that one might 
consider restrictive, and not reflecting the usual way memories disappear. However, even if we consider a 
very general case of information destruction/recording, another characteristic of the memorizing process is 
at work, which only allows us to make sense of past events. The memorizing process requires some kind of 
ordering mechanism with regard to the time of recording. This is not only necessary to access memories, 
but also to make sense of them. As I record events, information is not stored in an anarchic way: the process 
respects some complex (and largely not understood) rules to reflect a certain level of sequencing. When I 
remember someone who entered the room, I can’t mistake that with a supernatural apparition or with a 
realistic statue, nor will I think this person has always been there: I put this event in the context of other 
memories to make sense of the information I’m accessing (the fact that the door opened just before, or the 
fact we talked just after). It is because I can put a specific memory into perspective, in relation with other 
memories, that I can make sense of it. 
An ordering mechanism supposes a correlation between the time of information recording and the nature of 
the information (potentially including where it is stored). Yet, there is a fundamental asymmetry here. 
Recording information following the entropic arrow of time is done more or less continuously during our 
life through our senses, which enables this ordering mechanism. However, there are reasons to think that 
the destruction of memories happens in a much more erratic way, which does not allow such a correlation 
between the nature of the information and the time of its disappearance. For instance, we can assume that 
the mechanism at work to ensure the correspondence between a stored information and the moment of its 
storage is a complex and entropy-creating process, which brings us back to our first arguments regarding 
consistency and replicability. And if we consider the many ways information may be destroyed as a direct 
result of a macro-event like an accident or death, then all erased memories would have the same “time-
stamp” (they would not be time-wise segregated), and would therefore be useless. 
To conclude: whatever phenomenon we consider as potentially responsible for information 
destruction/recording in the future, because no ordering mechanism can happen as it happens in the 
recording process of past events, we have now way to make sense of future events. 
 
Using our senses to record the future 
We have left behind a hypothesis that may look obvious when one thinks about the question of remembering 
the future, but that does not fit easily the scientific approach of time symmetry. We can imagine that the 
recording process for future events may use the same path as the recording process for past events: our 
senses. We are then in the case of macro-events preceding the recording process, as seen before. Basically, 
we would be able to remember what we will see or hear in the future. However, this would imply a very 
special way to associate micro-events, working in a time-reversed process to build our memories of the 
future, with a macro-event preceding the recording. When we talked, above, about macro-events destroying 
our memories, this destruction was, a priori, a direct effect of this macro-event (the trivial case being violent 
death). However, in this new perspective, destruction of stored information would be the result of micro-
events triggered in the consistent, replicable and potentially ordered way of a usual memorizing process. 
Therefore, we are neither in the case of time-reversed micro-events that cannot be associated with any 
macro-event we can make sense of, nor in the case of a macro-event, direct cause of information 
disappearance, that we should consider backwards. Here, the usual sensitive path would be at work, resulting 
in the disappearance of recorded information… while recording new information, building memories of the 
past. The recording of new information may simply erase and replace some existing memories (in the case 
the same information storing system is used for both memories of the past and the future), or at least result 
in their destruction (in the case memories from the past and from the future use distinct storing systems). 
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Such a process could be consistent: by using the same sensitive path as the usual information recording 
process, it could also be insensible to micro-variations in the event to record. It could also be replicable, 
because it would be the result of an event-independent process. More surprisingly maybe, it could also be 
ordered with respect to time. If memories of the past and memories of the future do not share the same 
storing system, we can imagine that the information destruction part of the process targets specific zones 
depending on the time it operates. If they do, we can imagine the following mechanism: each recorded 
information of a past event stays in the brain during a period P that may be fixed, or at least whose length 
may follow a given rule. Then, a cycle of erasing/recording takes place in the brain. The destruction of 
information, result of a new recording through our senses, would therefore follow a certain temporal order 
(memories of the past could be copied in the brain though, to explain the long life of some of them). But 
there is no escape: because the memory recording process is still subject to the entropic arrow of time, its 
outcome occurs at t1>t0, where t0 is the time before which the information is fixed. Therefore, there is no 
way the brain can embed information that is the result of a sensitive recording of a future event.  
 
What if? 
Let’s assume I could access memories of future events, considering memories as information in my brain, 
regardless of how it will get there. Let’s assume I could also make sense of them. What exactly would I 
remember? 
Considering memory from the future perspective, state of atoms in the brain may be seen, as we discussed 
above, as the result of a time-reversed process concomitant with the disappearance of the stored information. 
Yet, at the moment I am accessing a memory, two things may occur: either this information accessing 
process alters the stored information, or it does not. Therefore, remembering a memory would consist in 
making sense of events that are, in the first case, concomitant with the very fact I am currently accessing 
this memory, and in the second case, that are accompanying the loss of this very memory. If we were able 
to make sense of our “memories of the future”, remembering would turn out to be a curious thing: memories 
would either directly reveal the very act of remembering, which would probably make them useless, or they 
would very often reflect the time of our own death.  
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Even if accessing memories does not alter them, a possible outcome of the remembering process could be 
even more troublesome. As we act mostly according to our memories and as our actions end-up having 
effects on our lives and ultimately on our death, there may be a complex causal chain between the fact we 
access our memories and the events leading to the loss of those memories. Remembering the future would 
therefore mean making sense of events that depend on the very fact we are remembering them. That would 
bring us in an infinite recursive loop that would have nothing to envy to the usual paradoxes of time travel. 
 
Conclusion 
Time-symmetry of the laws of physics forces us to evaluate potential implications for what fundamentally 
contradicts this reality on a daily basis: our memories. We remember our past, we do not remember our 
future. However, analyzing the remembering process, and the potential ways to explain the presence of 
stored information in our brain with regard to the entropic arrow of time, I showed that potential memories 
have very different relationships, although equally real, with past and future events. This dissymmetry is 
linked to the memorizing process we have inherited through evolution. If we can remember macro-events 
from the past that have meaning for us, thanks to a consistent, replicable, segregating, and ordered 
mechanism, the only “memories” we may have of the future are associated with events that we can’t make 
sense of. Implications, if we could, would be either pointless, mystical or self-contradictory. 
So, let’s conclude: Is there a chance we may remember the future? … Forget it! 
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